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Introduction
One of the primary aims of growth theory has been to explain why growth rates differ across countries and over time. According to the neoclassical approach, these differences could be explained by the diversity of the growth rates of inputs that make up the production function. Yet, endogenous growth theorists stress the role played by this function. They argue that not only does growth vary across countries due to dynamic resource endowment; it also varies, to an important extent, on the form of the production function. Although a shared shortcoming of this approaches is the fact that both are supply-side oriented: as long as resources are available, growth will materialize and demand will play a minor role, if any.
However, demand matters for an open economy. In order to grow, not only are inputs to production necessary; but there also must be a market in which to sell goods. 1 Due to the structure of consumption, a country cannot consume every new good produced; instead, some new goods must be exchanged for other goods, which better fit domestic demand. Since, in a pure neo-classical framework, every country can sell goods produced at the international price, this fact adds nothing new to the standard one-sector theory. But if price elasticity is not infinite, the country must reduce either the selling price -thus worsening the terms of trade -or the potential output. In both cases growth depends on demand, in value terms in the former and in quantity terms in the latter.
In contrast to neo-classical and endogenous growth theories, the Keynesian approach to growth considers that the exogenous variable is not the amount of inputs, but the quantity of output, which in turn determines the level of employment. One the most fruitful Keynesian-oriented growth approaches is the balanceof-payments (BoP) constrained growth theory developed by Thirlwall (1979) . According to this theory, since relative prices do not play an important role in international trade, and the BoP must be in equilibrium in the long run, growth is BoP constrained.
Despite its empirical support, Thirlwall model shows some deficiencies. While these are noted in the literature, two must be highlighted here. First, although in the long run the BoP must be in equilibrium, short-andmid-run disequilibria are permitted in the real world and this must be incorporated into the model; otherwise the empirical testing of the theory can lead to a misinterpretation of the results. Second, the role of relative prices is oversimplified. Contrary to Thirlwall's theory, an economy may be BoP constrained while, at the same time, relative prices impact growth.
In this paper we intend to develop an augmented Thirlwall model in order to overcome the deficiencies mentioned above. Our model gives a more important role to both BoP disequilibria and relative prices. The model is tested against the cases of Spain and Portugal for several reasons. First, both Spain and Portugal are BoP constrained. Second, both countries have experienced major changes in their external sector following their respective accessions to the European Union (EU) and the European Monetary Union (EMU). According to Thirlwall´s theory, and most of the models inspired by it, it is irrelevant to long-run growth whether an economy uses an independent or a common currency. As we shall see, this is not the case, at least not for the Iberian countries. Finally, since Spain and Portugal adopted the euro, the Spanish and Portuguese economies have followed an opposite path, due to reasons closely related to what our model predicts.
Thirlwall's Law and its Limits
The BoP constraint theory originally developed by Thirlwall is built upon the following set of equations:
where X and M denote export and import volume, respectively; P and P* stand for domestic and foreign price level, respectively, both expressed in a common currency; Y* and Y represent world and domestic income, respectively; A and B are constants, η and γ are price elasticities of imports and exports, respectively; and and are import and export income elasticities, respectively. Taking logs and time derivatives and plugging the dynamic version of (2) and (3) into (1) 
This expression is known as Thirlwall's law. It states that long-run growth depends only on external income growth multiplied by the ratio of income export-to-import elasticities. Therefore, in order to grow above this rate, a country must be able to improve income elasticities. Otherwise, increases to inputs will have no impact on growth.
The law has been tested in many works. In Thirlwall's pioneering study, it was tested by applying the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient to the actual and the hypothetical growth rate (calculated according to (5)). However, following criticism by McGregor and Swales (1985) , the law was tested by regressing hypothetical growth on actual growth. If Thirlwall's law holds, the intercept should equal zero and the hypothetical growth coefficient should equal one. Generally speaking, the empirical work supports Thirlwall's law (McGregor and Swales, 1985 , 1986 Bairam, 1988; Bairam and Dempster, 1991; MacCombie, 1989 and 1992; and Sonmez Atesoglu, 1993 , 1994 and 1995 .
However, it is important to note the basic assumptions of Thirlwall's model and the criticism of each, since these critiques have been useful in developing further extensions of the model. Thus, the first crucial assumption is contained in equation (1). It states that the BoP must be in equilibrium. This is a plausible hypothesis in the long run but not in the short run. In practice, there is no objective way to distinguish between short and long run, two concepts that, in addition, may change across countries. For example, suppose that we test the law in a certain country by regressing the actual growth rate on a theoretical growth rate, and the result is a deviation. We can not conclude from this evidence that Thilwall's model is unsound if the possibility of temporary BoP disequilibria is accepted. The economy can be long-run BoP constrained but not, for example, in the last five years of our sample, so our results will be biased. For this reason, capital flows and BoP disequilibria must be incorporated into the model. Indeed, Thirlwall himself presented three years later an extended version of his original model (Thirlwall and Hussain, 1982) . In this extended version, capital inflows are incorporated into the model by adding a new term to equation (1). It must be noted that allowing disequilibria through this addition does not invalidate the BoP constraint theory, since capital inflows are not endogenous to potential growth. It simply means that the external constraint can be relaxed for an economy in a certain moment in time. In fact, what Thirlwall and Hussain found is that the sample countries were BoP constrained, but the growth rates estimated using the new extended model aligned more closely to actual rates than did the old ones. Other extended versions in the same line were developed by Elliot and Rhodd (1999) , Hussain (2000) , Moreno-Brid (1998 , 2001 and Britto and McCombie (2009) , finding new evidence to support the BoP constraint theory.
The second crucial assumption of Thirlwall model relates to relative prices. According to Thirlwall, relative prices do not play a role in long-run growth for two reasons, which are, to some extent, incompatible. The first is the stability of relative prices in the long run, so that PPP theory holds. The second is that price elasticities are very small in absolute terms, so the expression (1+γ+η) is close to zero. It is only by assuming the former that equation (4) becomes equation (5). Yet, as Alonso and Garcimartín (1998) noted, this is a strong assumption and, furthermore, it is not necessary. Relative prices may play a role and the economy can still be BoP constrained. What is relevant to the theory is not if relative prices have an impact on growth but whether or not they are endogenous to BoP disequilibria. If relative prices decrease in the presence of a deficit, then the neo-classical approach to growth is correct and growth will not be BoP constrained. But, if they are exogenous, the mentioned approach will be incorrect. In the Alonso and Garcimartín's sample of ten OECD countries, they found that relative prices were exogenous in all cases. On the contrary, they argued, the crucial test to the BoP constrained theory is whether or not income (and not prices) adjusts to BoP disequilibria. And this was the case for eight of ten countries in the sample. Other works, using cointegration techniques, also have tested for the long-run adjustment of actual income to BoP constrained income (Alonso, 1999; Bagnai, 2008; and Britto and McCombie, 2009) , while other studies have explicitly tested the adjustment of income to BoP disequilibria (Garcimartín et al., 2008) .
Both critiques are important and must be incorporated into any extension of Thirlwall´s model. This means that 1) capital flows must play a role in relaxing (temporarily) the BoP constraint; 2) although it does not invalidate the BoP constraint hypothesis, relative prices can influence growth, at least in the short-run and, therefore, the model must take this effect into account; and 3) in order not to reject the BoP constraint hypothesis, it must be shown that income adjusts to external disequilibria.
In the next section we build a BoP constraint model based on these three premises. Then, we test the model by applying it to two case economies: Spain and Portugal. As we demonstrate, the converse performance of these economies can be explained in terms of the BoP constraint theory. In order to do this, an important role must be given to relative prices.
3. An Augmented BoP Constrained Growth Model
As stated in the previous section, our aim is to develop a model that incorporates capital inflows, allows relative prices to play a role, and tests whether or not income adjusts to BoP disequilibria. This model is presented in the following five equations 2 . Each equation represents the adjustment path of the relevant variable to its partial equilibrium level, so the significance of parameter α i is crucial to validate the equilibrium equations 3 .
1) Income (6) where Y represents income, X and M are exports and imports, respectively, XP and MP refer to export and import prices, ER is the exchange rate, Z 1 represents net unrequited transfers 4 and Z 2 stands for net capital inflows.
This equation tests the BoP constraint hypothesis, which cannot be rejected as long as α 1 is positive. Thus, in the presence of a deficit, the parenthesis of eq. (6) will be negative, and income will tend to decrease. Yet, Z 2 can relax the BoP constraint (γ 1 >0). If the economy shows an external deficit, income will tend to decrease, but this tendency can be mitigated, amplified or even reversed by capital flows. In other words, as shown later, capital flows will affect the speed of adjustment but not longrun growth.
2) Exports (7) Exports adjust to their partial equilibrium level at a rate defined by α 2 . The equilibrium level is the traditional export function, where exports are determined by the relative prices of exports (XP/ERP*) and by foreign income (Y*).
3) Imports ,
.
Imports adjust at a speed α 3 to their partial equilibrium level, which is defined by the relative prices of imports (MPER/P) and by domestic income.
4) Capital flows (9)
Capital flows find equilibrium at a speed α 4 .
That equilibrium is a constant, than can differ across countries and can be zero. What is relevant for an economy to be BoP constrained is that capital flows do not adjust to BoP disequilibria (at least, not in the long run). In other words, external deficits cannot be permanently financed by capital inflows.
5) Exchange rate ,(10) .
First, we consider prices in domestic currencies as exogenous. Second, the exchange rate is assumed to adjust to its equilibrium level at a speed α 5 . This equilibrium is the PPP exchange rate plus a constant, since there may be permanent deviations from PPP due to the presence of non-tradable goods or barriers to trade. In addition, capital flows can influence the speed of adjustment of the exchange rate, but not its equilibrium level. Thus, if the exchange rate is above its equilibrium, it will tend to converge toward it, but this path can be mitigated, amplified or even reversed by capital flows. These will not affect the long-run exchange rate but can influence short-run deviations.
The steady-state rate of growth of income in this model is
where i stands for the steady-state growth rate of variable i. This expression can be interpreted as follows. First, in the long run income is BoP constrained, since capital flows do not permanently finance external deficits. In fact, if prices do not play any role, this expression becomes ble, the BoP will show a deficit; and income (though not the rate of growth of income) will be above the level compatible with external equilibrium.
Second, prices do not play a role as long as the exchange rate adjusts to its PPP value. Otherwise, prices have an impact on growth (if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds). This means, for example, that exchange-rate policies can influence (positively or negatively) growth, as long as they are able to maintain the exchange rate deviation with respect to its PPP value. What is important is that even if prices play a role, this does not imply that the BoP theory does not hold. This becomes important in explaining the recent economic performance of Portugal and Spain. Finally, note that if exchange rates perfectly adjust to their PPP values, then equation (11) becomes Thirlwall's law.
In sum, the model presented above differs from the standard Thirlwall's model in the relevance given to capital flows in the income and exchange rate adjustment paths, and the role that relative prices can play. Capital inflows can slow down BoP adjustment, and growth can be maintained above its long-term rate for a longer period of time. At the same time, capital inflows can slow down the exchange rate adjustment, thus penalising growth. On the contrary, capital outflows, in the presence of an external deficit, can constrain growth to a greater degree, while simultaneously facilitating an exchange rate adjustment, fueling exports and fostering growth. In the next section we show that this double effect of capital flows is crucial to understanding the two different types of BoP constrained growth recently experienced in Portugal and Spain.
4. An Application of the Model. Portugal and Spain in the Euro Area: An Opposite Experience
The Spanish and Portuguese economies experienced similar performance in the decades leading up to entry into the euro area. Trade barriers were reduced, fiscal and monetary conditions improved and income per head had been approaching the European average. As a consequence of the modernisation of these economies, both countries met the so-called Maastricht criteria and gained access to the euro area in 1999 with the first group of countries that adopted the euro as the common European currency. (Figure 1 ).
Regarding the BoP (goods and services), between 1995 and 1998 -just prior to joining the EMU -Spain exhibited a small surplus (0.3% of GDP), while Portugal experienced a large deficit (7.6% of GDP). Yet, from 1999 onwards, the Spanish surplus turned into a high deficit, while the Portuguese deficit decreased. By 2007 the BoP outcome for both countries was similar (Figure 2 ). Why have these countries shown such contrary performance since joining the EMU? Why has Spain experienced an economic boom unknown since the 1960s, while Portugal has suffered such a long-lasting stagnation?
The augmented BoP constrained growth model presented above helps answer these questions. Our hypothesis is twofold. On the one hand, both economies are BoP constrained. On the other, the EMU has amplified their respective economic cycles. Spain has exhibited growth over a longer period of time because capital inflows have financed BoP deficits during a longer timeframe than usual, since no currency devaluation was expected. Portugal, on the contrary, has experienced a longer-thanusual stagnation because the return to BoP equilibrium has taken a longer time than usual, since no devaluation -which could improve the BoP outcome -has occurred. Both countries joined the euro in different phases of their respective BoP cycles: Spain was close to equilibrium, while Portugal had a large deficit. In addition, as we shall see below, while the conversion rate of the Spanish currency against the euro was close to its PPP value, the Portuguese currency was converted at a notably appreciated rate with respect to its PPP value.
Before presenting the results of our estimates, some remarks must be made. First, a dummy, accounting for the effect of the accession to the European Union, has been included in export and import equations (μ 1 and μ 2 , respectively (Carter and Nagar, 1977) is 0.55 for Portugal and 0.28 Adjustment parameters are significant to a 95% probability, except α 4 in Spain, whose level of significance is 90%. Further, each parameter has the anticipated sign, so all endogenous variables adjust to their long-run equilibrium levels (Table 1 ). In particular, the positive sign of α 1 indicates that both economies are BoP constrained rather than resource constrained, and therefore one of the essential hypotheses of this study cannot be rejected. In addition, γ 1 is positive and significant in both countries, which means that capital flows influence the speed of adjustment for income; that is, its short-run rate of variation, but not its long-run growth rate. If capital flows to a country experiencing a BoP deficit, income can grow beyond equilibrium. Similarly, if capital flows out of the country, the adjustment of income will be faster. But, capital flows do not change the long-run income growth rate. This is due to the fact that the long-run value of capital flows is a constant (k), which is positive for Portugal and not significantly different from zero for Spain. In addition, γ 2 is positive and significant in both countries, which implies that the speed of adjustment of capital flows to equilibrium has been reduced since the introduction of the euro. In other words, if capital inflows are above the equilibrium level, they will decrease (though, since 1999, the speed of this decrease has declined. This is probably due to the lack of an exchange rate).
Regarding trade functions, price and income elasticities are significant and show the expected sign in both countries, while the EU dummy is only significant in Portugal and shows a negative value in the case of imports (at a 90% significance level).
9 Of importance, price elasticities (β 1 and β 3 , for exports and imports, respectively) are negative, and the term (1+γ+η) lies below zero in both countries: -1.02 in Portugal and -1.73 in Spain. Therefore, the Marshall-Lerner condition holds: relative prices matter. This does not invalidate the BoP constrained growth theory as long as income adjusts to BoP disequilibria. As stated above, this has been the case for the Iberian countries.
With regard to the absolute values of trade for Spain and, since the value of the 2 at a 99% significance level is 30.6, the hypothesis that the model is not consistent with the data must be rejected in both cases. 9 It must be noted that Bagnai (2008) did not find any structural break in import function either for Portugal or for Spain. elasticities, previous studies show significant differences amongst them. Broadly speaking, our estimates are slightly higher that the average. Leaving aside differences in sample periods and econometric techniques, this can be attributed to the fact that we employ weighted averages to measure foreign income and prices, in the case of exports. We use, as weights, each trade partner's share of total exports (Appendix II). Thus, export income elasticity reaches 2.75 in Portugal and 2.53 in Spain. For the former, a value of 1.30 was found by Senhadji and Montenegro (1999) With respect to price elasticities, all are significant. Exports have a value of -0.86 in Portugal and -2.09 in Spain. Senhadji and Montenegro (1999) found for Portugal an export price elasticity of -2.92, while according to Antunes and Souziakis (2009) , it is not significantly different from zero. In their study, although they find evidence supporting BoP constrained growth, they state that prices do not matter in Portugal because elasticities are irrelevant. We disagree with this view and, as we demonstrate below, the recent lose of price competitiveness has been one important factor behind Portuguese stagnation. Regarding Spain, export price elasticity reaches -1.0 in Mauleón and Sastre (1994) , -0.59 in Alonso and Garcimartín (1998) , -0.8 in García and Gordo (1998) and -1.3 for goods and -0.9 for services in Banco de España (2008) . In the case of imports, our estimates show price elasticities of -1.16 and -0.64 for Portugal and Spain, respectively. For the former, Antunes and Souziakis (2009) Finally, concerning the exchange-rate equation, the positive and significant value of α 5 indicates that the exchange rate adjusts to its equilibrium level. This level is its PPP value plus a constant, which stands for a permanent deviation from the PPP value. It must be highlighted that this is of the utmost importance, since it shows that relative prices (the exchange rate) have a long-term value that is independent of the BoP outcome. In addition, γ 3 is negative and significant for both countries, and therefore the exchange rate speed of adjustment depends on capital flows. If the currency is overvalued, it will depreciate, but capital inflows can slow down or even reverse this trend. On the contrary, capital outflows accelerate it. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 As we have assessed above, after Spain and Portugal adopted the euro in 1999, economic performance differed for each country. Portugal was beginning to descend from the recently-reached peak of its cycle and its BoP showed a huge deficit (10% of GDP) when it adopted the new currency. Spain had not yet reached the top of its cycle and its BoP had a much lower deficit (1.8 of GDP), even when it had shown a surplus two years earlier at the time of adoption. Note the important role played by net capital inflows in each of these cases. As can be seen in Figure 3 , from 1999 to 2003 Portugal experienced a sharp decrease in capital inflows. This should have accelerated the depreciation of the escudo, fuelled exports, decreased imports, improved the outcome of the BoP and fostered income growth. However, this could not happen because the escudo -as a currency -no longer existed. As a consequence, the adjustment was forced to take place via income. On the contrary, Spain had a much better BoP situation and, as we show below, the value of its currency was much closer to its PPP value. Following the adoption of the euro, the country continued to grow and the BoP started to deteriorate. By 2004 Spain had a deficit of 4% of GDP and had experienced a growth rate above 3% in seven of the previous eight years. Under normal conditions the economy would have adjusted via a reduction in income growth, experiencing currency depreciations and capital outflows. Yet, the euro changed this pattern. Capitals continued to flow into the country since exchange-rate risk had vanished. This made it possible to finance the BoP deficit for a longer period of time, and the economy continued growing above its external constrained level. In sum, the euro changed the speed of adjustment, as it has also been pointed out by Decressin and Stavrev (2009) . In the case of Portugal, depreciation was no longer possible and the country remained below its equilibrium level for a longer period. In the case of Spain, the euro facilitated the entry of capital flows and the country remained above its equilibrium level for a sustained period of time. It is important to note that the path of the escudo prior to the introduction of the euro was different to that of the peseta. Thus, between 1991, the year before the last crisis of the European Monetary System, and 1999, the year that the euro was virtually introduced, the escudo depreciated by 16.3%, while its PPP value dropped by 27.4%, which implies an 11.1% appreciation of the Portuguese currency against its PPP value. The peseta, on the contrary, depreciated by 15.4% against its PPP value in the same time period (Figure 4) . In fact, when the Iberian countries joined the euro, the escudo/deutsche mark exchange rate was set at 102.5 and the peseta/deutsche mark at 85.07. Yet, according to the estimates of our model, the equilibrium exchange rates should have been 129.9 and 90.58, respectively.
Therefore, Spain joined the euro with a slight (6%) appreciation of its currency following a period of depreciation that saw its currency above its 1994/95 equilibrium value. Alberola. et al. (1999) and Alberola and López (2001) found similar results. On the contrary, according to our estimates, Portugal joined the euro with a strong appreciation of its currency (21%) (Figure 5 ). The escudo was notably below its equilibrium level. Bulir and Smidkova (2005) and Barrell et al. (2002) To see the impact of this overvaluation of the escudo on the euro area, we can compare accumulated equilibrium growth rates between 1999 and 2007 inside and outside the euro area; that is, with a fixed exchange rate and with an equilibrium exchange rate. The former would have yielded 19.8% and the latter 39.2 (Table 2) . While these results can be biased because of the time it takes to reach equilibrium values, they serve to highlight two important points. First, relative prices matter even in the context of BoP constrained growth. Second, they have mattered more for Portugal since its adoption of the euro.
Spain's story is different. It joined the euro when the BoP, capital inflows and the exchange rate were close to equilibrium levels. Under normal conditions, the natural sequence of events would be income growth above equilibrium and external deficits financed by capital inflows. However, with the introduction of the euro and the subsequent disappearance of exchange rate risk, the impact on income growth could last for a longer time. Figure 6 shows the external deficit beginning to correct in 2000, following the usual trend, but in 2002 this trend is reversed, and deficits begin to grow, reaching higher-thanusual levels. This means that income could grow above its equilibrium rate. 00 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 Source: World Bank To empirically support our model, we have used it to analyse a case in which prices and capital flows indeed have played a significant role: the opposite evolution of Portugal and Spain after the introduction of the euro. While the former has suffered a deep stagnation, the latter has experienced a significant boost. Ac-cording to our model, both economies are BoP constrained. But, while the Portuguese economy joined the Euro in a moment when it was far from equilibrium (strong external deficit and overvalued currency), Spain did so close to equilibrium. The European common currency amplified the economic cycles for both countries. For Portugal, this has meant a longer time in the bottom side of the cycle; for Spain it has meant a longer time on the top of its cycle. Yet, Spain has already entered into the adjustment phase and, as the Portuguese lesson shows, it may take a long time to complete it; longer than in the past. As Blanchard (2006) Finally, let us stress that we do not mean that a monetary union is a bad thing in a BoP constrained growth world. Undoubtedly, it has many positive effects on trade and growth.
What we mean to demonstrate is that it can be dangerous if relative prices move far away from the equilibrium level. As Blanchard (2006) assessed in his analysis of the recent evolution of the Portuguese economy, the return to equilibrium can be difficult and take a long time.
Appendix I. The steady-state rate of growth
The steady-state solution of the model can be found using the method of undetermined coefficients, where all variables -with the exception of dummies-grow at a constant rate, which can be zero.
Therefore each variable (i) at time t can be defined as -X. Exports of goods and services. Source: World Bank.
-M. Imports of goods and services. Source: World Bank.
-XP. Exports price deflator. Source: Source: World Bank.
-MP. Imports price deflator. Source: Source: World Bank.
-P. GDP price deflator. Source: World Bank.
-P*. Foreign price level. This index was constructed by weighting the GDP deflators of Portuguese and Spanish export destination countries: , where P j, is the GDP deflator of country j, e j represents the exchange rate against the currency of country j, and w j is the weight of country j in Portuguese and Spanish exports. To construct this indicator we used the top-36 export destinations. Therefore, the evolution of relative prices with respect to the rest of countries is considered to follow this weighted average. All foreign prices have been converted into deutsche marks, which has been used as vehicular currency in this paper. Source: World Bank.
-Z. Index of net current transfers, net FDI and EU transfers (Regional and Cohesion Funds until 1991 and Structural Actions afterwards). Source: for the first two variables, World Bank, for the latter, European Commission.
-Y*. Weighted foreign GDP. The weights are the share of each country in Portuguese and Spanish exports. As in the case of foreign prices, we have only used the top-36 export destinations to construct this variable. Source: World Bank Z 2 . Net portfolio investment and net other investment. Source: World Bank.
ER. Exchange rate against deutsche mark. Source: World Bank PPP. Purchasing Power Parity exchange rate. It has been computed by multiplying the actual exchange rate by the World Bank PPP conversion factor to official exchange rate ratio.
